There has been much recent theological and political attention given to the impact a gift economy might have on a market economy. Pope Benedict XVI, in his latest encyclical, has argued that “in commercial relationships the principle of gratuitousness and the logic of gift as an expression of fraternity can and must find their place within normal economic activity”. The new EU President, Herman Van Rompuy, has recently given a speech in which he advocated for a gift economy for Europe. The notion of a ‘gift economy’ appears to be a somewhat novel idea in modern Western politics. However, there has been a rich discussion about ‘gift’ in philosophy, anthropology and theology that has its roots in the seminal work by anthropologist Marcel Mauss, The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Society (1950). The cross disciplinary debate reveals that there is not a consensus over the appropriate definition of ‘gift’, particularly as it results to the purpose and outcome of economic activity. In order to evaluate whether the notion of ‘gift’ has particular relevance for economics, it is important to consider what a theological definition of gift might entail. The following paper brings the apostle Paul into conversation with the recent debate resulting in an attempt to develop the outlines of a Pauline theology of the gift. Though this (rather long!) post does not explicitly connect the discussion to economic theory and policy, it provides a theological basis for such a discussion.
“Can a gift be given?” asks the provocative theologian John Milbank.[i] Within this apparently simple question lies a rich history of recent scholarship in areas as diverse as anthropology, philosophy and theology. Though modernity might be coming to an end, its most effective carrier, capitalism, maintains its grip on the political economies of most, if not all, nation states. The success of capitalism can partly be explained by the hold it has had on the social imagination. This is best summed up by the phrase Margaret Thatcher commonly used: TINA – There Is No Alternative. At about the same time France Fukuyama declared ‘the end of history’ as humanity had entered its final societal stage with the combination of liberal democracy and capitalism.[ii] Capitalism’s apparent ‘success’ has not only reached an economic hurdle with the recent economic crisis triggered by the sub-prime crisis and resulting credit crunch, but it has long had its philosophical, moral and theological detractors. Part of this criticism of capitalism has been the attempt to ‘imagine’ an alternative economy. It is in this context that the notion of ‘gift-exchange’ has flourished. Drawing on archaic societies, scholars have used the notion of ‘gift’ to examine the often hidden assumptions about personhood, ontology, economics and social relations in Western society. Significantly, theologians have entered this debate, seeing a strong connection between the language of gift and that of grace. This paper will attempt to trace aspects of the recent philosophical and theological investigations of ‘gift’. These will then be compared with the apostle Paul, whose understanding of gift/grace offers a rich resource for contemplating the social and economic impact of the Christian faith. The thesis of this paper is that Pauline theology offers an answer to the key question of reciprocity in contemporary philosophical and theological literature.
The academic discussion of gift can be traced back to the French anthropologist Marcel Mauss who in 1950 published The Gift: The Form and Reason For Exchange in Archaic Society.[iii] Mauss discovered that in archaic societies, the understanding of gift was radically different to that of Western society where gift was considered to be a one-way act of charity. In contrast, Mauss found that in non-western society, gifts were always reciprocated, and the act of giving and receiving formed the definitive social bond in society. His concern was to answer the question: “What rule of legality and self-interest, in societies of a backward or archaic type, compels the gift that has been received to be obligatorily reciprocated? What power resides in the object given that causes its recipient to pay it back?”[iv] Mauss concluded that the act of giving, receiving and returning a gift is an event imbued with social meaning that involved every aspect of society. It is no mere ‘economic’ activity but involves the whole social landscape. It is the paradigmatic social act. Mauss found that this activity was a competitive one with the act of giving always concerned with power and honor. Crucially, this exchange resulted in a moral bond between the giver and the recipient. The item that was exchanged became the means of solidarity for that society. The anthropologist Mary Douglas recognizes that Mauss’s project was in part politically motivated and acted as “a plank in the platform against utilitarianism.”[v] Douglas contends, “The sparks from Mauss’s grand idea might well light a fuse to threaten methodological individualism and the idea of a free gift.”[vi]
Mauss’s comparative study reveals that the notion of a free gift is predicated upon a particular anthropology. It is based upon individualism, and despite its pretense to be an act of generosity, it reinforces the separation of people from one another. Mauss’s work can be read as a claim for an alternative social vision where solidarity, not individualism, is the guiding theory.
Perhaps the most influential figure to adopt the language of gift is the French philosopher Jacques Derrida. In order to understand how Derrida understands ‘gift’ it is important to understand the significance of the ‘other’ for Derrida’s philosophy. James K A Smith considers Derrida’s entire work to be one of introducing the ‘other’. In order for there to be truly an ‘other’, Derrida calls us to “hospitality – making room for the Other, receiving the Other as wholly Other.”[vii] The opposite of hospitality is violence. Any imposition of the self is therefore a violent act. Derrida is interested in the notion of gift precisely because in it he sees a difference to contracts and exchange that are by definition inhospitable and therefore unjust. A pure gift breaks the cycle of exchange. Derrida argues,
For there to be a gift, there must be no reciprocity, return, exchange, counterfeit, or debt. If the other gives me back or owes me or has to give back what I give him or her, there will not have been a gift, whether this restitution is immediate or whether it is programmed by a complex calculation of a long-term deferral or difference.[viii]
Therefore, any form of reciprocity is antithetical to Derrida’s notion of gift. Indeed, Derrida extends his understanding of gift to the extent that it becomes ‘impossible’. For a gift to be truly gift, it must be anonymous, both for the giver and the recipient. Derrida argues that for the recipient, “It is thus necessary, at the limit, that he not recognize the gift as gift. If he recognizes it as gift… the simple recognition suffices to annul the gift.”[ix] It must also be entirely spontaneous, and as such, no pre-existing relationship between giver and receiver can exist. Indeed, a gift cannot be a gift if the giver is aware of it: “the simple intention to give, insofar as it carries the intentional meaning of the gift, suffices to make a return payment to oneself.”[x] The pure gift is thus, in Derrida’s understanding, ‘impossible’. For Derrida, we both need the notion of gift, yet we cannot have it. Theologian David Bentley Hart has critiqued the logic of Derrida’s argument. Hart questions why “put any emphasis on purity of intention when considering the gift unless one assumes in some sense the priority of a subjectivity that possesses a moral identity prior to the complex exchanges of moral practices, of gift and gratitude?”[xi] Hart recognizes that Derrida’s approach reveals a particular anthropology, that of the isolated subject that is a moral actor prior to any engagement with the other. Though Derrida sought to critique the commodity exchange of capitalism with the gift, it seems as if his anthropology is not significantly different from that which he is critiquing.
The Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor has drawn out this point in significant detail in his book A Secular Age.[xii] Derrida is a prototype of what Taylor calls the ‘modern misanthropic stance’.[xiii] This refers to those who occupy the ‘counter-enlightenment’, the Romantic movement of which Nietzsche was the key historical figure. In the face of the perceived meaninglessness of the world, with no possibility of hope or redemption, life continues to be lived and the ethical continues to be sought. For Taylor, “It is… absolute heroism…[which] partly accounts for the great prestige of this position in our day.”[xiv] It is primarily an ethical stance toward the world, rather than an epistemological one. It is revealing that for Derrida, the pure gift is found in sacrificial death, as there can be no hope for return. For Derrida, this means that even the Crucifixion is not a pure gift because of the promise of Resurrection. However, Taylor points out that this ‘heroism’ is predicated on a particular anthropology and teleology. Taylor’s response is worth quoting in full:
Is this the ultimate measure of excellence? If we think of ethical virtue as the realization of lone individuals, this may seem to be the case. But suppose the highest good consists in communion, mutual giving and receiving, as in the paradigm of the eschatological banquet. The heroism of gratuitous giving has no place for reciprocity. If you return anything to me, then my gift was not totally gratuitous; and besides; in the extreme case, I disappear with my gift and no communion between us is possible. The unilateral heroism is self-enclosed. It touches the outermost limit of what we can attain to when moved by a sense of our own dignity. But is that what life is about? Christian faith proposes quite a different view.[xv]
For Derrida, as for Camus and Nietzsche, the heroic stance is that of a lone individual in the midst of a meaningless world who ultimately can only offer himself. Taylor points out that this anthropology and teleology is in conflict with Christianity. If the telos of life is communion, then reciprocity cannot be construed in a negative fashion. This understanding will be expanded later on with an exploration of Pauline theology.
Perhaps the most significant theological voice to enter the debate has been that of John Milbank. Milbank is critical of Derrida, who he considers to stretch the notion of gift beyond use. His main criticism is that Derrida’s understanding of the ‘pure gift’ is a rejection any notion of reciprocity. For Milbank, Derrida has unknowingly assimilated the Kantian understanding of the moral significance of ‘disinterestedness’, which Milbank rejects. Whereas Derrida rejected Mauss’s interpretation of the gift for this reason, Milbank reclaims it, albeit in a different manner: “I venture to suggest that this possibility or actuality – purified gift-exchange – and not ‘pure gift’ is what Christian agape claims to be.”[xvi] A purified gift exchange thus is a recovery of the notion of reciprocity. In order to show that reciprocity need not be capitalist exchange under a different name, Milbank argues the return gift has to have two characteristics. These are a delay in the return gift and a non-identical return gift. Milbank is careful to point out that “a crucial aspect of my argument for agape as the consummation of gift-exchange, that these categories are by no means perfectly or consistently exemplified in local gift-economy societies which, from a Christian viewpoint, should be regarded as possessing a merely ‘advent’ character.”[xvii]
The theological basis for this purified gift-exchange is Trinitarian. God’s giving is the source of our giving, and our return to God consists of gratitude and the passing on of gift to our neighbor. Milbank contends that “we participate in the Trinitarian exchange such that the divine gift only begins to be as gift to us at all…after it has been received—which is to say returned with the return of gratitude and charitable giving-in-turn—by us.”[xviii] In this sense, reciprocation is a condition of the gift itself. By stipulating that reciprocity is involved in divine-human gift giving, Milbank is careful to note that God is not on the same level of gift giving as humanity: “Unilaterality and reciprocity can operate simultaneously, yet at different levels of causality. Supremely… God unilaterally gives a creature whose whole existence must be response to him.”[xix] Whereas for Derrida, the gift was conceived with an individualistic anthropology, for Milbank the gift is only gift in relation to others.
Milbank’s theological interpretation of gift can be helpfully compared to Kathryn Tanner.[xx] Tanner also appropriates the language of gift, and whereas Milbank only implicitly considers the economic implications, Tanner attempts to construct a theological economy. Interestingly, Tanner has little use for Mauss’s approach to gift-exchange. She considers it to be essentially capitalism in disguise. This is because for Tanner, the primary negative aspect of capitalism is competition. She locates the source of competition as being the exclusive private property rights which create the condition of scarcity. This results in an inevitable competitive situation between individuals. In Mauss’s portrayal of archaic society, competition is clearly evident. As such, Tanner rejects the usefulness of ethnographic research for constructing a theological economy. Her contrast with Milbank does not end there as Tanner is clear that she considers divine-human gift giving to be completely unilateral and therefore without human reciprocation. Divine gifts are entirely unconditional, as God is fundamentally a giver. She locates her theological position as following Calvin’s lead.[xxi] Tanner also locates her theology in the life of the trinity. She emphasizes the non-competitive nature of gift giving in the trinity and argues that we can imitate that non-competitive gift giving in society. This requires rethinking self-possession and private property rights by recognizing that everything comes from God, and it comes to a community, not an individual. Therefore, the appropriate return on divine gift giving is to the neighbor, with nothing going back to God. Whereas Milbank argues that unilaterality and reciprocity can be held together with different levels of causality, Tanner opts entirely for unilaterality.
This brief survey of recent philosophical and theological reflections on ‘gift’ reveals some key areas of contention. Perhaps the most significant is that of reciprocity. Philosophically, Derrida rejects the notion of reciprocity as contaminating the pure gift. Perhaps there is a residue of this within Kathryn Tanner’s theology, which echoes this perspective, at least in the arena of divine-human gift giving. However, Milbank desires to maintain an understanding of reciprocation even in divine-human gift giving. Taylor’s critique of Derrida is particularly useful as it reveals how the ethical argument for unilateral gift giving is so strong in late modern western culture. This is due to notions of stoic heroism that epitomize the likes of Camus and Derrida. This raises the significant question of whether our hesitancy to ascribe human reciprocation to divine gift giving has been influenced by a modern, moral sentiment that is at some distance from a Christian one. Taylor’s criticism, along with Hart’s, also reflects the significance of anthropology and teleology for this question. If humans are fundamentally relational beings and the purpose of existence is communion with God and one another, reciprocation has to be considered as the ethical norm despite what our modern sensibilities tell us.
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