This post follows on from the previous post and it develops the discussion by focusing on the contribution Paul would make to the debate over the meaning of ‘gift’.
The reflections from the last post will now be brought into conversation with the apostle Paul. This will be achieved by briefly examining the social context of gift giving in the Greco-Roman world and assessing the influence this would have had on Paul. Then I will consider the variety of biblical scholarship on Paul’s interaction with gift-exchange before arguing that to understand how Paul understands gift, one needs to investigate how he conceives of Israel as gift (or resulting from grace) and subsequently and paradigmatically, Christ as gift. This will draw out the unique understanding that Paul has of gift and reciprocity.
In the same way that Derrida, Milbank and Tanner could only be understood in relation to their engagement with Marcel Mauss, Paul can only be understood in relation to Seneca, whose De Beneficiis offers the definitive Greco-Roman treatise on gift-exchange. Milbank refers to Seneca as a ‘proto-modern’, due to his concern with the inner motivation behind the gift.[i] Seneca claims, “A gift consists not in what is done or given, but in the intention of the giver or doer.”[ii] Thus Milbank argues that for Seneca, the gift is more about duty and virtue than about the social bond it creates.[iii] Whether Milbank is reading too much of Kant back into Seneca, it is clear that the modern understanding carries this stoic notion of disinterestedness as found in Seneca. For Seneca, gift giving is not simply about exchange. One should not give with the intent of receiving back, though Seneca points out that one should determine who should receive a gift. Only the worthy or the fitting should receive gifts. This was a common understanding in both the ancient world and parts of the contemporary non-western world, that only the worthy should receive gifts. Anthropologist Maria Heim recognizes that in South Asia, “The emphasis on giving to the worthy encourages a keen eye for the moral qualities of the recipient. Charitable gifts made out of altruism are generally not regarded as meritorious.”[iv] The obligation to return the gift is as clear in Seneca as in Mauss. The system of reciprocity is certainly what Mauss calls a ‘total social fact’, involving every aspect of society and layered with meaning. So significant was the system for Seneca that even if a return is not given, one should not cease giving, as the recipient must eventually respond.
The significance of the gift-giving or benefaction in the contemporary world of Paul is recognized by Gerald Peterman, who argues that in Paul’s contemporary situation, “patronage, friendship and relations between family members (especially between parents and children) all contain elements of social reciprocity.”[v] Peterman posits that the “Greco-Roman world… has very clear social expectations with regard to giving and receiving. Cognizance of benefaction, debt and obligation occurred in every relationship we have been able to study.”[vi] James Harrison argues that the notions of gift giving and reciprocity in Paul’s cultural circumstance can be traced back to what he terms “Greco-Roman benefaction ideology.”[vii] Harrison collects a significant amount of evidence to make this case, and his argument strongly suggests that the notion of benefaction in Seneca would have been pervasive in Paul’s day.
Paul’s interaction with the contemporary understanding of gift giving and reciprocity has caused much debate among biblical scholars. The key question is to what extent did Paul adopt, reject or modify contemporary notions of gift-exchange in the Pauline epistles, particularly as it relates to the gifts/grace of God? What was the impact of this, and what effect does this have on our understanding of Pauline theology? What is the connection between grace in God’s relationship to the church and gift giving in human-human relationships? Paul Harrison argues that whilst Paul regularly used the notion of gift, he rejected any understanding of reciprocity in divine-human relationship. He argues that inscriptional evidence suggests that there is a certain language associated with reciprocity that Paul refused to use when developing his ideas of charis. The times that Paul does mention reciprocity terminology (2 Cor 6:13;Phil 4:15; 1 Thess 3:9; 1 Tim 5:4), he redefines reciprocity. Paul opts for the language of abundance to accompany charis rather than that of reciprocity. Harrison interprets this as clearly showing that for Paul, “God operates on the basis of His overflowing grace over against the obligation of reciprocity.”[viii] For Harrison, Paul’s understanding of grace entails a rejection of reciprocity.
In contrast to Harrison, Stephen Joubert argues that Paul positively adopted the Greco-Roman notion of gift-exchange, modifying it and not rejecting it.[ix] He focuses on Paul’s collection for Jerusalem and argues that Paul rethinks gift and reciprocity in light of his experience of the Christ-event. Paul puts the emphasis on the inner motivation behind the gift and not the receiving of honor. In this sense, Joubert argues that Paul’s understanding is somewhat similar to Seneca’s. However, Joubert reflects that Paul reoriented the Greco-Roman notion of giving only to the worthy. Paul’s appeal to help Jerusalem was based, in part, on their poverty. As such, Joubert’s argument suggests that, at least in this sense, Paul’s understanding of gift is completely distinct from Seneca’s notion that gifts should only be given to worthy recipients. As will be argued, this is a crucial aspect of Paul’s understanding of gift. Troels Engberg-Pedersen argues that Paul adopts entirely Seneca’s notion of gift giving and reciprocity: “Paul may profitably be read as employing the notion of charis (and related terms) in accordance with the logic of the system spelled out by Seneca.”[x] Engberg-Pedersen appears to miss a crucial point in Paul’s theology of grace that Joubert mentions: the role of the gift to the ‘unworthy’ – the ‘unfitting’ gift.
Whereas Harrison focused on gift/grace as it relates to Paul’s understanding of God’s acts of grace, Joubert primarily focused on Paul’s understanding of gift/grace as it relates to the relationship between Paul, Jerusalem and the other churches. Are the two arguments combinable or in conflict? Can it be argued that for Paul, there is no reciprocity in the God-human relationship but there is reciprocity in the human-human relationship? This argument would be similar to that suggested by Kathryn Tanner. Or are the two intrinsically and necessarily related as Milbank suggests, and as such, are Joubert’s and Harrison’s arguments incompatible?
This evaluation of recent literature on Paul and gift reveals two aspects that are central for understanding Paul’s theology of grace. In light of Engberg-Pedersen’s comments, what is the significance of the unfitting gift for Paul? In light of the contrast between Joubert and Harrison, what is the relationship between divine and human agency in Paul’s theology of grace?
John Barclay compares Philo’s interpretation of divine mercy regarding the election of Israel with Paul’s.[xi] This contrast helpfully elucidates the uniqueness of Paul’s theology and, in doing so, refutes Engberg-Pedersen’s thesis that Paul simply repeats Seneca’s understanding of gift-exchange. In Barclay’s portrayal, Philo is the one that encapsulates the notion that a gift should be given only to the worthy. The Genesis narratives regarding Noah, Melchizidek, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Ephraim and Bezalel have in common the fact that all the protagonists receive favor or blessing from God before there is any mention of them meriting such favor through good works. In each case, Philo interprets the meaning of the names of the protagonist to show “the ‘soul character’ or ‘nature’ that is recognized by God and accounted worthy of benefit or grace.”[xii] This is crucial because it interprets God as giving only ‘fitting’ gifts to the worthy and thus ensures moral order in the universe. Philo’s ‘creative’ exegesis stands in stark contrast to Paul, who in the famous passage in Romans 9-11 interprets the blessing that is given to the Patriarchs and others as nothing to do with any capacity of the protagonist. Perhaps the most significant instance of this is the election of Isaac and not Jacob that occurred before they were born. Paul accentuates this and thus parades “the complete independence and sheer autonomy of divine choice.”[xiii] Barclay concludes that for Paul, “God does not just ‘name’ those whom he blesses, he ‘calls them into existence’, in the sense that he creates them ex nihilio, by a process of election that transforms those whom it chooses, ungodly though they be.”[xiv] For Paul, in opposition to Seneca, God’s grace is dangerous precisely because it is a gift to the unfitting. The paradigmatic moment of this is the Christ-event. Paul speaks directly to the impact of this when he writes to the Romans, “While we were still sinners, Christ dies for us” (Rom 5:8). The social implications of this are significant for the Greco-Roman world. As Joubert recognized, in light of God’s gift, human gift giving should also include, perhaps primarily, gifts to the unfitting. This is not the heroic disinterestedness of Derrida by any means as the purpose of God’s election, and more significantly the purpose (or telos) of the Christ-event is communion. In this sense, Milbank and Taylor are right; if the end is communion or participation in God, then unilateral gift giving is inappropriate.
Barclay’s interpretation of Paul’s understanding of God’s grace as creating and transforming those whom God chooses is crucial for understanding the question of diving and human agency. In this way, we can theologically understand how reciprocation is necessary, even in the divine-human relationship. Much theological discussion since the late medieval period has adopted an ontology that has been unhelpful in interpreting the relationship between divine and human agency. Aquinas spoke of the analogia entis, the analogy of being, which posits that God is of an infinitely different kind of being to humanity though we can speak analogously of the relation between God and humanity. In contrast, in the thirteenth century, Duns Scotus developed an alternative ontology: the univocity of being. This considered that there is only one kind of being of which both God and humanity are a part. The theologian Catherine Pickstock comments, “This indifferent Being, shared between the infinite and the finite, might seem to confer a degree of proximal relation between the two realms.”[xv] The effect of this is therefore, in terms of agency, God and humanity are in competition. This helps explain the antithetical logic particularly evident in the theology of the reformation. Divine agency rules out the possibility of human agency. As evident in the theology of Kathryn Tanner and Miroslav Volf[xvi], this means that there can be no reciprocation of divine gift, rather God’s gift is the ‘pure gift’. Barclay’s interpretation of Paul suggests otherwise. In that God’s grace is creative and transformative, we can speak of divine agency creating human agency (that is action oriented towards the good) and thus enabling a response, a reciprocation of worship and thanksgiving, to God. This also means that the possibility of human gift giving is created by divine grace. As such, this helps interpret why the Jerusalem collection is so significant to Paul. It is the substantive evidence of divine grace. Barclay’s argument find support in Francis Watson, who contends that for Paul, “Divine and human agency do not co-exist on the same plane, in such a way that more of one means less of the other. Rather, God’s prior grace works in and through the human agent, who’s reoriented and free agency is itself the work of grace.”[xvii] There is an analogous assertion made by John Milbank, who argues that unilaterality and reciprocity can operate simultaneously as there are different levels of causality.[xviii] The implication is to speak of humans in some sense returning a gift to God. We do not therefore have to imply that God is simply an equal partner in gift exchange. The argument can be made ontologically through Milbank, or exegetically through Barclay and Watson, that God is fundamentally different to humanity and is the prior giver that creates the possibility of human reciprocation back to God, in some sense, and correspondingly to others.[xix]
In conclusion, Pauline theology offers a rich resource for theologians and philosophers wrestling with ‘gift’. It elucidates the good of reciprocity and offers a framework for thinking how this can even apply in divine-human relationship. Paul’s notion of the gift has an implicit anthropology and teleology that point towards a stark alternative towards that of both consumer capitalism and postmodern philosophy. It offers a strong critique of Derrida’s notion of ‘pure gift’, and theological notions of unilaterality of God’s gift giving as found in Kathryn Tanner. There are useful comparisons to be made between the ontological arguments of John Milbank and exegetical arguments from the Pauline corpus. This paper has just scratched the surface of the impact of Pauline theology on contemporary notions of gift. Another possible area of impact is the Christological character of Paul’s understanding of gift. This would critique the theology of both Tanner and Milbank, which seek to develop a theology based in an examination of the inner life of the trinity. This approach is certainly of some benefit, though it can often be taken to an extreme that suggests the absence of any epistemic humility. Christology might prove a more adequate theological basis.
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